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NALLY V. GRACE COMMUNITY CHURCH: IS
THERE A FUTURE FOR CLERGY
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley
("Nally IIr'),' the California Supreme Court reversed a court
of appeals decision ("Nally II")2 which held that plaintiffs
could bring a suit for negligent failure to prevent suicide
against pastoral counselors affiliated with Grace Community
Church ("Church").3 The appeals court decision had "generated a veritable firestorm of controversy in the nation's law
reviews,"4 as well as considerable press. The decision was
termed the "seminal case in a new cause of action frequently
labeled 'clergy malpractice."' 5 Theoretically, in order for a
clergy malpractice claim to be recognized by a court, the
cleric's behavior must fall outside the scope of other recognized torts, and the acts of the defendant must fall within the
realm of intentional tort law, not malpractice. 6 The traditional elements of a tort action 7 would necessarily have to be
met, although a different duty and standard of care would ap1. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley ("Nally II"), 763 P.2d
948 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989).

2. Nally v. Grace Community Church ("Nally II"), 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Ct.
App. 1987).

3. Nally III, 763 P.2d at 948. In addition, claims were brought for wrongful
death, negligence, and outrageous conduct. Id. Nally may have been responsible for the filing of at least four related cases. See Lawrence M. Burek, Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy Accountable to a Lower Power, 14
PEPP. L. REV. 137, 141-42 (1986) [hereinafter Burek] for a list and discussion of
these cases. Each of the four cited cases was dismissed because of the trial
judge's apparent concern with constitutional issues, liability, and policy mat-

ters. Id.
4. Nally 11, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
5. Id.
6. Sue Garske Graziano, Clergy Malpractice, 12 WHITTIER. L. REV. 349,
350 (1991). Professional malpractice involves a higher standard of care than a
negligence action and does not engage in a determination of whether the departure was the proximate cause of the injury. Id. at 349. Courts that have been
presented with claims involving other recognized torts have inevitably chosen
to base the recovery on that theory. See infra notes 340-41 and accompanying
text.
7. The traditional elements of negligence are:
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ply. The establishment of a standard of care causes the most
difficulty in a clergy malpractice cause of action due to possible First Amendment entanglement problems.'
To date, every state that has considered a cause of action
for clergy malpractice has rejected it.9 Nally v. Grace Community Church was the first such attempt. 10 Nally II was the
first step in paving the way for a cause of action for clergy
malpractice. The U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Employment Division v. Smith 1 made recognition of the cause of action possible. Thereafter, when Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") 12 the future of the
cause of action was not as clear.
This comment examines the Court's holding in Smith,
and the message sent by Congress via RFRA, and applies
both to the facts of the Nally case, and the cause of action for
clergy malpractice, to determine whether the protections of
the First Amendment and the protection of the individual can
be harmonized in order to allow a cause of action for clergy
malpractice. It begins by briefly tracing the development of
the Free Exercise Clause cases. 1 3 The comment then analyzes the Nally case and concludes that under Smith, a cause
of action for clergy malpractice is actionable. 4 The comment
then suggests the proper standard of care for such an aca. A legally recognized duty to act as a reasonable person under the
circumstances;
b. A breach of the duty by failing to live up to the standard;
c. Proximate cause which includes cause in fact; and
d. Actual loss or damages.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 164-65
(5th ed. 1984).
8. Graziano, supra note 6, at 350; Burek, supra note 3. See also discussion
infra Part II.A.3.
9. See Dausch v. Ryske, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 n.4 (7th Cir. 1994) (providing
an inventory of all state supreme courts that have held there is no cause of
action for clergy malpractice).
10. Graziano, supra note 6, at 351.
11. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Smith Court held
that the First Amendment has not been offended by a generally applicable statute that had the incidental effect of burdening free exercise. Id. at 878. Therefore, a generally applicable statute providing for the referral of suicidal patients
to qualified therapists would not unconstitutionally infringe upon or burden the
clerical counselor's free exercise of religion.
12. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(a)(1), (2) (1994)).
13. See discussion infra Part II.
14. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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tion. 15 It also briefly discusses the constitutional shortcomings of RFRA and anticipates the future of a similar case
under it.' 6
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The FirstAmendment
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
mandates that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."17 The first clause is referred to as the Establishment Clause, and the second, the Free Exercise Clause.
The Supreme Court has held that both of these clauses
are applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."8 There is an inherent tension between the two clauses, often forcing the Court to
choose between competing values in religion cases.' 9 The
general guide is the concept of neutrality: The government
must act20to achieve only secular goals in a religiously neutral
manner.
1. The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment has
been interpreted to provide that the government cannot create a law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. 21 Free exercise problems arise when the government, acting in pursuit
of non-religious objectives, either forbids or burdens, or alterwhich happens to be
natively compels or encourages, conduct
22
belief.
religious
someone's
dictated by
While the Supreme Court has proclaimed that the right
of free exercise is not absolute, 23 the courts have limited intrusions into the practices of a religious group in instances
15. See discussion infra Part V.B.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. J. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1157 (4th ed. 1991) [hereinafter
NOWAK ET AL.].
19. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
20. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 18, at 1157.

21. Id.
22. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304.
23. Id. at 303-04.
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where societal interests are threatened.24 Specifically, the
courts are loathe to inquire into any area which involves the
doctrinal formulations of a particular church or religion.25 In
essence, courts are forbidden to examine the truth or sincerity of any religious instruction or representation.26 What
they may determine, however, is whether the beliefs or ideals
are truly held by the parties in question.
During the thirty year period of 1960-1990, the Supreme
Court was divided over the extent to which the Free Exercise
Clause permitted the imposition of a law of general applicability on persons whose sincerely held beliefs prevented their
compliance with the law. 28 Then, in 1990, Employment Division v. Smith was decided, holding that the Free Exercise
Clause does not require such exemptions from religiously
neutral laws of general applicability.29
2. The Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause is violated when the government aids or sponsors religion.3 ° Where the Establishment
Clause is implicated, the applicable test is the Lemon test derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman.3 1 In Lemon, the Court determined that state action must satisfy three tests in order to
24. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (prohibition against
destroying draft cards upheld); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(holding that state laws withholding unemployment benefits from those who
refused "available suitable work" could not be applied to claimant who refused
to work on a Saturday because that was her Sabbath, because it imposed a
burden on the free exercise of the plaintiffs religion, and the state had no compelling interest in enforcing the eligibility requirements of the statute). Id. at
398, 403, 406.
25. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hill Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944);
Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577, 600 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
26. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 83 (1944).
27. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
28. NowAK ET AL., supra note 18, at 1218. During this period, it appeared
that the Court would balance the importance of government interest that was
furthered by such a law against the burden on persons who could not follow
their religious beliefs if they complied with the law. Id. However, during this
period, the government won virtually every case which did not involve the punishment of religious beliefs. Id.
29. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
30. NowAK ET AL., supra note 18, at 1161. At its inception, the clause may
not have been intended to prohibit governmental aid to all religions, but today
the accepted view is that it also prohibits preference for religion over non-religion. Id.
31. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970).
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survive an Establishment Clause challenge.32 First, the state
must have a secular purpose; second, the action must not primarily advance or prohibit religion; and third, the action
must not lead to excessive government entanglement in religion.33 It is the third prong of the test that may lead to
problems for a clergy malpractice cause of action if the standard of care is designed as to force governmental intrusion in
religious doctrinal philosophies. 4
There is disagreement about whether Free Exercise
Clause or Establishment Clause decisions are controlling in
clergy malpractice claims. 35 This comment assumes the application of the Free Exercise Clause, unless otherwise
36

indicated.

3. The Difficulty with the Creation of a Standard of
Care
The creation of a standard of care is the biggest obstacle
in a clergy malpractice cause of action due to possible First
Amendment entanglement problems. 37 The difficulty occurs
in ensuring that a court is not involving itself in the evaluation of religious or doctrinal content of the practitioner's beliefs.3 It is permissible, however, for the state to regulate
neutrally. 39 The government has a right, as well, to regulate
acts prompted by religious beliefs when they threaten public
safety, peace or order.4 °
32. Id. at 612-13.
33. Id.

34. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
35. See Lee W. Brooks, Intentional Infliction of EmotionalDistress by Spiritual Counselors: Can OutrageousConduct Be "FreeExercise"?, 84 MICH. L. REV.

1296, 1322-24 (1986) [hereinafter Brooks].
36. The courts that have addressed clergy malpractice claims have generally raised the constitutional issues in terms of the Free Exercise Clause. Mark
A. Anthony, Comment, Through the Narrow Door: An Examination of Possible

Criteriafor a Clergy MalpracticeAction, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 493, 502 (1990).
37. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

38. This comment does not seek to examine the religious roots of therapy.
For a discussion of the same, see James K. Lehman, Note, Clergy Malpractice:

A ConstitutionalApproach, 41 S.C. L. REV. 459 (1990) [hereinafter Lehman].
39. NowAK Er AL., supra note 18, at 1165. The government will not have to
grant an exemption from a religiously neutral regulation of activities of all persons if the regulation does not impose a significant burden on the ability of

persons seeking the exemption to maintain their religious beliefs. Id.
40. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (citing Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1978); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14
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A standard of care is one component of a legal duty that
relates to the behavior or conduct required of the acting party
in a given situation.4 1 Many commentators have suggested
standards of care to be utilized in a clergy malpractice claim,
the three most popular being the secular standard, 42 the denominationally specific standard,4 3 and the state of the art
concept.44
a. The Secular Standard
The secular standard adopts the position that pastoral
counseling is separable from the more obviously religious
functions of the cleric, 45 and thus, more similar to counseling
performed by psychiatrists and psychologists.46 Under the
secular standard, comparable standards to that of psychia47
trists apply.
b. The State of the Art Standard
The state of the art standard is a corollary to the secular
standard.48 It requires that the clerical counselor keep
abreast of psychological principles and trends.49 Compliance
with the state of the art standard might force a member of
the clergy to adopt principles and methods which would conflict with his religious or doctrinal beliefs.50
c.

The Denominationally Specific Standard

The denominationally specific standard is "based on the
accepted care demonstrated by other members of the clergy
(1946); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
41. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 164-208.

42. See generally C. Eric Funston, Comment, Made Out of Whole Cloth? A
ConstitutionalAnalysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL W. L.REV.
507 (1983) [hereinafter Funston].
43. Id. at 523.
44. See generally Ben Zion Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First look
at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 47, 59 (1981) [hereinafter
Bergman].
45. See Funston, supra note 42, at 513.
46. Id. at 514-20.
47. Id. at 517.
48. Burek, supra note 3, at 153.
49. Id. Therefore clergy would be required to have, at minimum, an elemental psychological knowledge. Id.
50. Id.
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5
within the sect and the scope of training in the community." '
The structure of this standard requires that the court investigate and identify the religious doctrinal stance of the clergy
in order to compare his or her conduct with 52the conduct of
others in the community with similar beliefs.

d. Neutral Standard of Care
The neutral standard consists of a threshold test which
must be met to determine if the standard of care may be imposed, before proceeding to a three prong test which focuses
on whether a violation occurred at all, as opposed to the degree of violation.5 3 In order for liability to be evaluated, only
one of the three prongs need be violated.54
The standard of care for a clergy malpractice cause of action must be formulated in such a manner that it passes the
current free exercise test applied by the courts. 55 Otherwise,
the cause of action would be unconstitutional, and the claim
for clergy malpractice would fail.56
The Sherbert Test
Prior to the Smith decision in 1990, free exercise chal57
lenges were subjected to the "compelling interest" test. The
compelling interest test was reformulated and applied to free
58
exercise claims by Justice Brennan in Sherbert v. Verner, in
1963.59 The compelling interest test is a balancing test consisting of two parts. First, the plaintiff must show a substantial burden on the exercise of his or her religion by the law
under review. 0 Second, the burden would be sustained only
if a court found it necessary to a "compelling state interest"
B.

51. Id. at 152.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 157.
54. Burek, supra note 3, at 152.
55. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
57. NowAK ET AL., supra note 18, at 1209. The Supreme Court opinions
used a balancing test which read as if it gave significant protection to religiously motivated actions, and thus required significant governmental accommodation of religion. Id. In fact, the Court ruled against persons seeking a religiously based exemption from any law of general applicability in every area
except unemployment eligibility requirements and compulsory education for
Amish children of high school age. Id.
58. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 403-04.

474

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

which outweighed the degree of impairment of free exercise

rights. 6 1 The test also requires that the government show

that "no alternative forms of regulation would combat such
abuses without infringing First Amendment rights."62
The compelling interest test was used by the federal
courts to strike a balance between religious liberty and governmental prerogatives; otherwise, a broad interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause could have rendered many, if not
most, governmental acts susceptible to challenge. 63
1. Facts of Sherbert
The plaintiff in Sherbert was a member of the SeventhDay Adventist Church.64 She was discharged by her South
Carolina employer because she refused to work on Saturday,
the Sabbath Day of her faith. 65 Unable to obtain other employment because of the limitation, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under South Carolina's
Unemployment Compensation Act.66 The Act provided that a
claimant is ineligible for benefits if he has failed, without
good cause to accept available suitable work when offered to
him.67 The State Commission denied plaintiffs application
for benefits on this ground and its action was sustained by
the State Supreme Court.68
2. Holding of Sherbert
The United States Supreme Court in reviewing the
South Carolina Supreme Court's decision held that state laws
withholding unemployment benefits from those who refused
"available suitable work" could not be applied to the claimant
who refused to work on a Saturday because that was her Sabbath.6 9 The Court found that the disqualification for benefits
imposed a burden on the free exercise of the plaintiffs reli61. Id. at 406-07.
62. Id. at 407.
63. Tania Saison, Comment, Restoring Obscurity: The Shortcomings of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 653, 653
(1995) [hereinafter Saison].
64. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 400.
67. Id. at 401.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 398.
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gion, 70 and that the State had no compelling interest in enforcing the eligibility requirements of the statute.7 1
There is general agreement among legal scholars that
the Supreme Court has experienced difficulty in applying a
coherent compelling interest standard 7 2 and evidence that
the Court was moving away from the compelling interest test,
73
recognizing more limits on the free exercise of religion.
Such movement eventually resulted in the Court's short-lived
holding in Smith.
C.

Employment Division v. Smith
1. The Smith Decision

The Supreme Court's free exercise decision in Smith,7 4
decided in 1990, caused an uproar in the legal and religious
communities. 75 The plaintiffs in Smith were two drug coun6
selors employed by a private rehabilitation clinic. 7 The employees were denied benefits under an Oregon State statute
disqualifying employees discharged for work-related "misconpeyote at a ceremony of their
duct" because they had ingested
77
Church.
Native American
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue addressed was whether sacramental use of peyote was proscribed by the State's controlled substance law, and if so,
7
whether that prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause. "
The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause permits the
state to prohibit sacramental peyote use and to subsequently
deny employment benefits to employees discharged for the
same.

79

70. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
71. Id. at 406-07.
72. Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretative
Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994)
[hereinafter Berg]; Saison, supra note 63, at 666.
73. James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1418-20 (1992) [hereinafter
Ryan].
74. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
75. See generally Renee Skinner, Comment, The Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah: Still Sacrificing Free Exercise, 46 BAYLOR L.
REV. 259 (1994); Berg, supra note 72, at 5.
76. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. After the case was decided in 1990, the Oregon legislature exempted
the ban on peyote religious use by all but prisoners. Douglas Laycock, Essay,
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In reaching its decision, the Court abandoned the balancing exemplified by Sherbert and adopted a position of neutrality toward religion. 80 Under the new test formulated in
Smith, "if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . .is not the

object of the [regulation] but merely the incidental effect of a
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First
Amendment has not been offended." 8 ' The Court maintained
that the compelling interest analysis would continue to apply
to hybrid claims, those combining religion with other constitutional rights.8 2 The majority justified its decision by asserting that the Court had applied strict scrutiny analysis in
two instances only; when evaluating religious claims involving a second constitutional right, and when evaluating cases
involving exemptions to state unemployment compensation
laws. 8
According to legal scholar, Douglas Laycock, Justice
Scalia's formulation of the Smith rule can be attributed to the
way in which he defines religious liberty or government neutrality towards religion. 4 In Justice Scalia's view, religious
liberty consists of not being discriminated against; as long as
the law applies to everyone, including those who are religious, religious liberty is fully protected.8 5 This is the application of a neutral, generally applicable law to a religious
86
group acting in violation of the law.
The Smith Court qualified its edict by stating that a regulation would still be prohibited if it excessively entangled
church and state by requiring the government to decide reliFree Exercise and The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
883, 888 (1994) [hereinafter Laycock].
80. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-89. The Court compared the statute to a general
tax to demonstrate its holding that if prohibiting the exercise of religion is not
the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended. Id.
at 878.
81. Id. at 878 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 881.
83. Id. at 881-82. For this proposition the Court cited Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943);
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
84. Laycock, supra note 79, at 885.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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gious issues or actively supervise religious activities." Some
scholars believed the Court had already been substantially
narrowing the reach of free exercise protection by instituting
a stricter determination of what constitutes a legally cognizable burden on religious conduct.8 8 Many commentators feel
that the Smith decision, by its willingness to disregard previous decisions, destroyed much of the constitutional protection
of religious practice. 89 Still others support the standard formulated in Smith. 90 The Smith decision was not without effect, as it resulted in a rash of denial of free exercise claims,
often on the basis of minimal government interests. 9 1
However, the Smith Court also encouraged legislatures
to enact "nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemptions"
through the political process, and ensured their constitutionality would be upheld.9 2 The Supreme Court probably did not
expect such a quick and powerful legislative response as
RFRA.
2.

Reaction to Smith
a.

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah

The Court's decision in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah,93 decided between Smith and the enactment of RFRA, gave the Court further opportunity to explain what Smith meant. In Lukumi, a Florida city council
enacted several municipal ordinances prohibiting sacrificial
animal sacrifice.9 4 Although the ordinances were facially
87. Id. at 885.
88. See generally Laycock, supra note 79, at 900-02; Berg, supra note 72, at
3 n.8, 29 (asserting that throughout the 1980s, the Burger and Rehnquist
courts had been undercutting the compelling interest test while continuing to
give it lip service).
89. See Berg, supra note 72, at 7; James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the
Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of
Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1, at 7-39; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
90. See Laycock, supra note 79, at 903 n.69 for a list of supporting articles.
91. See Berg, supra note 72, at 7 n.19 for list of supporting cases.
92. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
93. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
94. Id. at 526-27. One of the ordinances specifically addressed animal sacrifice which it defined as "to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an
animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of
food consumption." Id. at 527.
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neutral,95 they were struck down96 because they operated to
target the Santeria religion for discriminatory treatment,
while exempting all other types of animal killing.9 7 The
Court announced that the Smith decision required that laws
enacted be both neutral and generally applicable, 9 and any
law that did not meet these requirements had to be narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. 99

Although he concurred in Lukumi, Justice Souter argued
that Smith should not be applied to future First Amendment
challenges to state actions. 1° ° Justice Souter argued that
neutrality should encompass more than the absence of legislative hostility towards a religious group.' 0 1 He then differentiated between two types of neutrality, "substantive" and
"formal."10 2 Justice Souter expressed his support of the for-

mer, representing the requirement that government accommodate religious groups by affording them exemptions from
even formally neutral laws, 1 3 as opposed to the latter exem10 4
plified by Justice Scalia in Smith.
95. Id. at 534.
96. Id. at 547. The ordinance provided an exception for slaughtering by "licensed establishments" of animals "specifically raised for food purposes." Id. at
527-28. The city council, prior to enacting the ordinances, had adopted a resolution which noted the "concern expressed by residents of the city that certain
religions may propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent with public
morals, peace or safety," and declared that "the City reiterates its commitment
to a prohibition against any and all religious groups which are inconsistent
with public morals, peace or safety." Id. at 526.
97. Id. at 540-41. Justice Kennedy writing for the majority stated that the
Court's review "confirmed that the laws in question were enacted by officials
who did not understand, failed to perceive, or chose to ignore the fact that their
official actions violated the Nation's essential commitment to religious freedom." Id. at 524. Justice Kennedy went on to state that "(tihe challenged laws
had an impermissible object; and in all events the principle of general applicability was violated because the secular ends asserted in defense of the laws
were pursued only with respect to conduct motivated by religious beliefs." Id.
98. Id. at 531.
99. Lukumi Babalu Aye, at 531-32.
100. Id. at 559 (Souter, J., concurring).
101. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 561-62 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter then concluded
that "[tihe proposition for which the Smith rule stands . . . is that formal neutrality, along with general applicability, are sufficient conditions for constitutionality under the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 563 (Souter, J., concurring)
(citations ommitted).
103. Id. at 562-63 (Souter, J., concurring).
104. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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Justice Souter also challenged the majority's characterization of prior free exercise precedent, 10 5 contending that
strict scrutiny had been applied in other than "hybrid" cases
or unemployment compensation cases. 10 6 He argued that the
Court had always focused on the burden placed on the challenging religious group as opposed to the character of the law
being challenged.1 0 7 Justice Souter asserted that the Smith
rule had limited precedential value, according to settled principles of stare decisis.108 Shortly after Lukumi was decided,
the United States Court of Appeal for the Seventh District
applied the Smith rule in a free exercise challenge case just
prior to the enactment of RFRA, illustrating the viability of a
Nally type claim under Smith. 10 9
b.

Dausch v. Ryske

In Dausch v. Ryske, 1" 0 the plaintiffs complaint was held
to state a cause of action for professional negligence and violation of the Illinois Sexual Exploitation in Psychotherapy
Act,'1 1 reversing the district court of appeal's holding in this
regard.1 1 2 The facts of the case indicate that the plaintiff entered a counseling relationship with a cleric after being advised to do so by her church. 1 3 The cleric informed her that
she was in need of secular counseling, and that he was quali105. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 566.
106. Id. at 566-67.
107. See id. at 569-70.
108. Id. at 571-72. Justice Souter felt that the Smith rule was not subject to
"full-dress argument" id. at 571 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 676-77
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) prior to its announcement, because neither
party in the case had "squarely addressed the proposition the Court was to embrace, that the Free Exercise Clause was irrelevant to the dispute." Id. at 57172.
109. See Dausch v. Ryske, 52 F.3d 1425, 1428 (7th Cir. 1994).
110. Dausch v. Ryske, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994).
111. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 740, para. 140 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
112. Dausch, 52 F.3d at 1429. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of counts against the church defendants for professional negligence, breach
of fiduciary duty, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and against the
clerical counselor for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id.
113. Id. at 1427-28 n.3. The plaintiff was referred to counseling with the
defendant by the church coordinator after he had contacted her about not attending church. Id. She was subsequently contacted by the defendant and offered his services. Id.
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fled to provide her with it. 1 14 The cleric then initiated a sex-

ual relationship with the plaintiff during the course of
therapy." 5
Circuit Judge Ripple's concurring opinion discussed the
viability of a clergy malpractice action when the cleric's counseling is based on purely secular considerations, such as the
sexual relationship involved in Daush.1 1 6 Judge Ripple recognized that the cause of action for clergy malpractice has
been "soundly rejected by the courts of Illinois and by all
states that have considered it, ' 1

17

because of the risk of First

Amendment entanglement outside the judicial discretion of a
court." 8 However, he determined, the refusal to examine the
pastoral activity of clerics has not been extended to situations
in which the conduct in question "does not bear such a direct
relationship to the doctrinal or organizational aspects of religious practice."' 19
Judge Ripple asserted "[s]uch activity can be proscribed
by a legitimate regulation of general applicability designed to
protect the health, safety or good morals of the community.

1 20

Such professional services as secular counseling,

when provided by a cleric, would be subject to the same legal
strictures as those imposed upon individuals who undertake
to provide equal services in a nonreligious setting. 121 Judge
Ripple suggested that under these circumstances, the claim
is for professional malpractice by a psychological coun-

114. Id. In fact, the defendant told the plaintiff such secular treatment was
included in his job description at Knox Presbyterian Church. Id.
115. Id. First, the defendant increased the frequency and length of the sessions. Then he told her "religion does not apply here. Your problems are so
deep you need more psychological treatment from me." Id. The plaintiff subsequently became very involved in the therapy and attached to the defendant. Id.
Then the defendant gave her an ultimatum: "I have been giving to you, and I
need something back for my services. You must give back to me or I will not
work with you anymore." Id. After the ultimatum, each session began with
sexual relations between the parties. Id.
116. Id. at 1431.
117. Id.
118. Dausch, 52 F.3d at 1432.
119. Id.
120. Id. (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 1434.
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selor, 1 2 2 the elements of a professional malpractice claim 1be23
ing the same elements required of any negligence action.
D.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
1.

Enactment of the Act

The Smith holding generated even more negative press
than did Nally 11.124 Smith prompted a coalition of unlikely
allies, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the
Traditional Values Coalition, and conservative religious
groups, to induce Congress to take action.1 25 In addition to
the myriad of religious and civil liberty groups, fifty law
professors signed the petition for rehearing. 1 26 At the signing
ceremony, President Clinton said that only divine intervention could explain the coalition supporting the Act's enactment. 1 2 7 Prompted by Justice Scalia's invitation in Smith for
Congress
legislative action to accommodate religious beliefs,
28
Act.1
Restoration
Freedom
Religious
the
enacted
2.

RFRA Provisions

In enacting RFRA, Congress effectively preempted the
Supreme Court and decided it would determine the Constitutional framers' intent in enacting the Free Exercise Clause.
Congress mandated that the Court resume use of the compelling interest test as applied to free exercise claims in Sherbert
122. Id. at 1433. See discussion supra Part II.A.3 regarding the difficulty
with this standard.
123. Id. at 1434 (citation omitted).
124. Citations to the critical literature are noted in Ryan, supra note 73, at
1409 n.15.
125. See Berg, supra note 72, at 12.
126. Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise and the
Amicus Brief That was Never Filed, 8 J.L. & RELIGION 99, 99-100 (1990).
127. See Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law ProtectingReligious Practices,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at A18.
128. Laycock has suggested that the religious conflict in today's society is not
one religion against another-the traditional conflict which prompted the First
Amendment-but a conflict of secular against religion. Laycock, supra note 79,
at 883-84. This type of conflict has become enormously more important due to
the fact that "society is pervasively regulated." Id. Laycock maintains the conwas of less importance in 1789, because protecting churches from governflict
ment regulation was not difficult because there was not much government regulation. Id. In light of this concept of religious freedom challenges, it is ironic
that Congress' response to the perceived ineptitude of the Court in dealing with
these challenges was to adopt more legislation.
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in all free exercise challenges that came before
v. Verner,
29
it. 1

RFRA sends a clear message through a series of purposes
and findings. One finding states that "the compelling interest
test as set forth in prior federal court rulings is a workable
test for striking a sensible balance between religious liberty
and competing prior governmental interests.""' The purpose
of the Act as stated is "to restore the compelling interest test
as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened."1 3 '
The Legislature's approach is in contrast to that of "formal" neutrality taken by Justice Scalia in Smith:13 2 "[L]aws

neutral toward religion may burden religious exercise as
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise."133 The focus of RFRA is on the effect a law's application
intent of the law.13 1
has on free exercise of religion, not the 135
Its approach is "substantive neutrality."
E. Reaction to RFRA
Several scholars have questioned the constitutionality of
RFRA and its reimposition of the Sherbert test for free exercise cases.1 36 As of yet, its constitutionality has not been
tested by the United States Supreme Court. Some commenCourt,
tators believe that should RFRA reach the Supreme
37
prevail.
will
holding
Smith
the
chance
there is a
129. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(a)(1), (2) (1994)).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(b)(1) (1994) (citations to Sherbert and Yoder
omitted).
131. Id.
132. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 bb-2(a)(2) (1994). This is in contrast to the position
adopted in Smith which rests on the principle of equal treatment between religion and other activities, or "formal" neutrality. Berg, supra note 72, at 23.
134. Berg, supra note 72, at 23.
135. See Id.; see also discussion supra Part II.C.1.
136. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Why the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional,69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437
(1994); Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the
Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEx. L. REV. 247 (1994).
137. See Berg, supra note 72, at 8. Berg anticipates that a vote on the issue
would be 5-4. The prospective decision on Smith is unclear however, given the
retirement of one majority and three minority votes. Id. at n.22.
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In October 1992, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
City of Boerne v. Flores.13 Oral argument was heard on February 18, 1997. The issue raised in Boerne is whether Congress lacked authority to enact RFRA. The City of Boerne
contended that RFRA is unconstitutional for four related reasons. 1 39 First, Congress lacked the authority to enact RFRA
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 140 Second,
the statute violates the separation of powers by returning to
the courts the tasks of accommodating general laws and religious practices after the Smith case denied the judiciary's
competency to do so. 1 41 Third, RFRA violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Fourth, RFRA violates
the Tenth Amendment. The district court, agreeing with the
City of Boerne, held that RFRA was facially invalid because it
infringed on the authority of the judiciary to "say what the
law is."1 4 2 The district court was persuaded as well that Congress had not invoked its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting RFRA. 14 3 The district court
certified its order for interlocutory appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth District and entered a
partial final judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro44
cedure 54(b).1
The court of appeals, persuaded that RFRA is constitutional, reversed the district court.' 45 The court of appeals
found that RFRA met the Katzenbach v. Morgan three-part
test for determining when Congress may "explicate textually
located rights and obligations pursuant to Section 5 ." 146 The
court explained that the three parts of that test are whether
the statute "may be regarded as an enactment to enforce [the
Fourteenth Amendment], whether it is 'plainly adapted to
that end' and whether it is not prohibited by but is consistent
with 'the letter and spirit of the constitution.' ",147 The court
held that the first part is met because it has been long estab138. 117 S.Ct. 293 (1996).
139. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Tex. 1996).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1354 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Boerne, 73 F.3d at 1354.
146. Id. at 1358.
147. Id. at 1357 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
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lished that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Free Exercise of the First Amendment.14 8 The second part of the test is met by the United
States' three remedial justifications for RFRA: first, RFRA
deters governmental violations of the Free Exercise
Clause; 149 second, RFRA prohibits laws that have the effect of
impeding religious exercise; 150 and third, RFRA protects the
free exercise rights of adherent of minority religions. 151 The
court found the third part of the Morgan test met because
RFRA does not violate any other provision of the
52

Constitution. 1

In responding to the district court's finding that RFRA
violated the separation of powers by displacing the authority
of the judiciary, the court of appeals compared RFRA to the
Voting Rights Act of 1964, and the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act Amendments of 1994.'15 In holding there was
no violation of the separation of powers, the court stated that
the Supreme Court's rejection of the compelling interest test
in free exercise claims rested on the Court's aversion to applying the test to facially neutral laws in the counterThe
majoritarian arena of constitutional interpretation. '
in
was
apparent
with
Smith
court of appeals' disagreement
its statement that an "anemic application of 'substantial effect' pushes the limits of congressional power to remedy."' 5 5
The court of appeals also held that RFRA does not violate
the Establishment Clause because "its remedial justifications
belie the City's contention that Congress acted with sectarian
purpose," and RFRA "no more advances religion than any
other legislatively mandated accommodation of the exercise
of religion."156

In response to the City's last contention-that RFRA violates the Tenth Amendment because it limits the power of
states to legislate "in the traditional ares of state sovereignty
148. Id. at 1358 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303(1940).
149. Id. at 1359.
150. Id. at 1359-60.
151. Boerne, 73 F.3d at 1359.
152. Id. at 1361
153. Id. at 1363. The Amendments were in direct response to Smith as well
and prevented states from prohibiting Native Americans from using peyote as
part of their religious practices. Id.
154. Id. at 1363.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1364.

1997]

CLERGY MALPRACTICE

485

and prominence,"-the court found the City's reliance on the
Supreme Court's decision last term in United States v. Lopez,"5 7 which held that the Gun Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress' power under the Commerce Clause mistaken. 1 58 The court differentiated the Commerce Clause
power from Congress' power to act under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and held that RFRA does not intrude upon state sovereignty any more than the myriad other
federal statutes that preempt state regulation,' 5 9 and that
RFRA's applicability to particular areas of state regulation is
best left to an individual case by case resolution, as the stat60
ute is not facially violative of the Tenth Amendment. 1
This term the Supreme Court will hand down its opinion
on RFRA generally and the Boerne case specifically. Within
the next year we will know whether the Supreme Court
agrees with the district court's holding that RFRA is unconstitutional or the court of appeals' decision that it is not.
Several other recent lower federal cases have discussed
the constitutionality of RFRA as well.16 In October 1994, not
long after RFRA was enacted, Swanner v. Anchorage Equal
Rights Commission, 6 2 raising a free exercise challenge under
RFRA, reached the Supreme Court.' 6 3 The Court denied the
petition of a writ of certiorari, but Justice Thomas dissented
allowing a glimpse of the Supreme Court
from the denial,
6
1
RFRA.1
of
view
Justice Thomas' interpretation of the RFRA standard becomes clear when he discusses his differences with the
Alaska Supreme Court's opinion holding that the prevention
of discrimination on the basis of marital status is a compelling interest.' 6 5 He forcefully accuses the court of "drain[ing]
157. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
158. Boerne, 73 F.3d at 1364.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Swarmer v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994);
Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994); Sasnett v. Dep't of Corrections, 891 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Wisc. 1995); Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Kalamazoo, 532 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
162. Swanner, 115 S. Ct. at 460.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. In a footnote, Justice Thomas explained that RFRA was enacted in response to the Court's decision in Smith, which had "supplanted the compelling
interest test in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence with the inquiry into
whether a governmental burden on religiously motivated action is both 'neutral'
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the word compelling of any meaning and seriously undermin[ing] the protection for exercise of religion that Con-

gress so emphatically mandated in RFRA, "166 appearing to
signal a fondness for a strict interpretation of the compelling
interest test, and thus willing compliance with RFRA.
Justice Thomas also briefly discusses the "considerable
confusion" the state courts have had in applying the SherbertYoder test to the specific issues of the Alaska case, indicating
167
his desire to quell the confusion.
Part of the problem with RFRA's application may lie in a
lack of its acceptance by lower courts. In Porth v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo,168 the Michigan Court of Appeals held RFRA controlling 1 69 in a case challenging the firing of a non-catholic teacher by the private catholic school for
whom she worked. 170 RFRA, in essence, trumped the State's
Civil Rights Act, and thus provided no recourse for the fired
17 1
employee.
The majority in Porth made a point of saying that it concurred with the criticism of Smith.172 However, Justice Murphy's concurrence questioned the constitutionality of the Act
and "Congress' authority to legislate the standard of review
applicable to a free exercise of religion claim."1 73 Justice
Murphy echoed the concerns raised in Canedy v. Boardman 174 by the U.S. District Court of Appeal for the Seventh
and 'generally applicable."' Id. at 460 n.1 (citation omitted). Justice Thomas
further explained that "as a substitute for constitutional protection, RFRA
grants a statutory 'claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government."' Id.
166. Id. at 461-62 (emphasis in original).
167. Id. at 462. Justice Thomas cited California case law, where the court of
appeal has twice applied the compelling interest test adopted by RFRA in
reaching decisions in direct contrast to the decision below, as a rationale for his
vote to grant certiorari in Swanner. Id.
168. Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 532 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995).
169. Id. at 197.
170. Id. Plaintiff brought her suit under Michigan's Civil Rights Act alleging
that defendant's refusal to renew her teaching contract constituted employment
discrimination. Id.
171. Id. at 197. The lower court had granted defendant's summary judgement basing its decision on the Free Exercise Clause.
172. Id. at 198.
173. Id. at 198. The court stated that "[blecause religious liberty is a fundamental freedom, our courts have a firmly rooted tradition of applying a compelling interest test to its regulation." Id.
174. Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994).
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Circuit, as well as several law review articles, that Congress
has overextended its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 175 Justice Murphy, however, agreed that strict
scrutiny is the standard to apply, because he interpreted
Smith as applying only to laws that punish criminal
conduct.

176

In Canedy v. Boardman, the court addressed RFRA in a
footnote, acknowledging that while a religion-based allegation was not raised in the case, it appeared that a later
amended complaint might contain one.1 7 7 The court explained that under Smith, the amended complaint would appear to challenge a religiously "neutral, generally applicable"
practice and therefore be doomed to fail, but the recent enactment of RFRA reversed Smith. 178 Without further evaluating what the result would be under RFRA, the court expressed concern that RFRA raised a number of constitutional
questions involving the extent of the Congress' power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as considered in
Katzenbach v. Morgan,'79 and cited numerous law review ar80
ticles detailing the issue.1

In Sasnett v. Department of Corrections,'I8 the United
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
actually reached the question of the constitutionality of
RFRA.18

2

The court held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment grants Congress "a broad but not unlimited ability to legislate in furtherance of equal protection under the
Civil War Amendments," and that Supreme Court precedent
indicates that "Section 5 applies fully to the earlier Amendments as well."' 83 Congress was "merely prohibiting otherwise lawful activity as a means of further enforcing constitu175. Porth, 532 N.W.2d at 201.
176. Id.
177. Canedy, 16 F.3d at 186 n.2.
178. Id.
179. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
180. Canedy, 16 F.3d at 186 n.2.
181. Sasnett v. Dep't of Corrections, 891 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Wisc. 1995).
182. Id. at 1315. The plaintiffs in Sasnett were "Wisconsin state prisoners
who challenged several internal management procedures, emergency rules and
permanent administrative rules regulating the types and amount of personal
property they could possess while in prison." Id. at 1308. The plaintiffs contended that the enforcement of the procedures and rules violated their constitutional rights of due process, equal protection of the laws and of free exercise of
religion under the Constitution and RFRA. Id.
183. Id. at 1315.
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tional rights."1 8 4 The court characterized RFRA as "a buffer

zone designed to protect and facilitate full enjoyment of the
constitutional right to free religious exercise,"18 5 as opposed
to plaintiffs' contention that it was an improper attempt by
Congress to "force an interpretation of the Constitution onto
the federal judiciary" in violation of the separation of powers
6
doctrine.

18

While the cases discussed above give a glimpse of the arguments in support of, and opposed to RFRA, the Supreme
Court is the final arbiter of its future. Accordingly, a discussion of the feasibility of a cause of action for clergy malpractice requires analysis under both the Smith test and RFRA.
F. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley
1. Facts of Nally v. Grace Community Church
The nontherapist counselors in Nally were members of
Grace Community Church of the Valley, a large Protestant
Christian congregation, which offered pastoral counseling to
church members "in matters of faith, doctrine, and the application of Christian principles.' 8 7 Pastors Thomson, Rea, and
Barshaw, who were among thirty counselors who provided
"biblical counseling" at the Church,' testified that they not
only possessed competence to treat a whole range of mental
illnesses, including depression and schizophrenia, but also
had broad experience in counseling of persons with suicidal
or even homicidal tendencies. 89 Their literature, including
the "Guide for Biblical Counselors," also professed that, "absent a gross physiological cause such as a brain tumor, 'every
emotional problem' was within the competence of the pastoral
counselor to handle," including "drug abuse, alcoholism, phobias, deep depression, suicide, mania, nervous breakdown,
manic depressive [disorder] and schizophrenia." 90
The counseling relationship between Nally and the
Church therapists began when Nally started attending the
184.
185.
186.
187.
(1989).
188.
served
189.
190.

Id. at 1318.
Id.
Id.
Nally III, 763 P.2d 948, 950 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007
Nally H, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 219 (Ct. App. 1987). The thirty counselors
a congregation of more than 10,000 people. Id.
Nally III, 763 P.2d at 965.
Id.
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Church in 1974, while he was studying at UCLA. 191 In early
1978, he established a "discipling relationship," a form of religious based counseling, with Pastor Rea, during which they
discussed family and girlfriend problems. 192 After breaking
up with his girlfriend in December of 1978, Nally became increasingly despondent and once again attended discipling
sessions with Pastor Rea. 193 In addition, Nally sought treatment from two physicians, and he was prescribed an antidepressant. 194
During a counseling session with Pastor Rea in February
1979, Nally indicated he had considered suicide in 1974 while
a student at UCLA. 195 In March 1979, Nally attempted suicide by a drug overdose and was hospitalized. 196 During his
hospitalization, Nally told Pastor MacArthur that he was
sorry he had not succeeded in his suicide attempt. 197 He told
Pastor Rea that given the opportunity after his release, he
would attempt suicide again. 9 8 Neither pastor conveyed this
information to any doctor, or to Nally's family. 199 While a
staff psychiatrist recommended that Nally commit himself to
a psychiatric hospital, the Nally family chose outpatient care
instead. 20 0 Nally was released and thereafter moved in with

Pastor MacArthur.2 ° '
Eleven days before his suicide, Nally asked Pastor Thomson during spiritual counseling, whether Christians who commit suicide would nonetheless be "saved."2 °2 Thomson re3
sponded that "a person who is saved once is always saved."20
191. Id. at 950.
192. Id. at 965-66.
193. Id. at 951. Nally had also seen a secular counselor for girlfriend
problems in 1975. Id. at 950.
194. Id. The physician also recommended a series of blood and chemical
tests but did not refer Nally to a psychiatrist. Id.
195. Nally III, 763 P.2d at 951.
196. Id. The drug Nally used was the anti-depressant that was prescribed to
him. Id.
197. Nally 11, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 220 (1987).
198. Id.
199. Nally III, 763 P.2d at 951. Thomson's rationale was that to do so would
be "like going to a fire, seeing a fireman there and calling the fire department."

Id.
200. Id.
201. Nally 11, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 220. Nally chose to return to the home of his
parents. Id.
202. Nally III, 763,P.2d at 952.
203. Id.
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Thomson subsequently referred Nally to a physician for a
medical exam, but not to a psychiatrist. 20 4 When Nally encountered Thomson several days later and told him he was
considering seeing a psychologist, Thomson recommended
that Nally contact the Director of the Rosemead Graduate
School of Professional Psychology, Dr. Mohline. 2°5 After a
ninety minute visit, Mohline referred him to the Fullerton
Psychological Clinic, where he saw a psychologist's
assistant.2 °6
Several days later, Nally's former girlfriend turned down
an apparent marriage proposal, stating "you have got to pull
yourself together. You have got to put God first in your
life." 20 7 Two days later, Nally was found dead of a self-inflicted gunshot wound.20 8
2.

The Appeals Court Decision

Nally is a case with a significant procedural history.
Summary judgment was originally granted in favor of the defendants. 20 9 The trial court granted the defendants' nonsuit
in deference to the pastoral counselors, stating that "[tihere
is no compelling state interest to climb the wall of separation
of church [and state] and plunge into the pit on the other side
2 10
that certainly has no bottom."
On appeal, the court reversed and remanded the trial
court's nonsuit.2 1 ' The case then went back to trial, and the
2 12
court again granted a nonsuit motion after three weeks.
Plaintiffs appealed, and the second appellate court reversed
the trial court's nonsuit, holding that together, both the
clergy malpractice and negligence claims could be construed
as stating a cause of action for the negligent failure to pre204. Id.
205. Id. Dr. Mohline later testified at the Nally trial as an expert on the
standard of care to be followed by pastoral counselors. Id. at 953. While Mohline was the dean of administration of a "school of psychology," he was not a
psychologist. Nally 11, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
206. Nally III, 763 P.2d at 952.
207. Id. at 953.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 954.
211. Id. at 953.
212. Nally H, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 222 (Cal. 1987).
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vent suicide by nontherapist counselors.2 1 3 The court held
that this would not impinge upon the free exercise of religion
guaranteed by the First Amendment, because the state's
compelling interest in the preservation of life justifies the
narrowly tailored burden on religious expression imposed by
2 14
such liability.
The crux of the court of appeal's decision was its finding
that a special relationship existed between the defendants
and Nally which created the requisite duty of care. 2 15 The
court relied in part on Bellah v. Greenson21 6 to make this determination. 2 17 Bellah recognized that a cause of action may
exist for professional malpractice when a psychiatrist's treatment of a suicidal patient falls below the standard of care for
the profession, thus giving rise to a traditional malpractice
action.2 18 The court of appeal also relied on the California
Supreme Court's holding in Vistica v. Presbyterian Hospital,2 9 which asserted that a hospital has a relationship with
its patients and a duty to take preventative measures where
it appeared likely that one of them might attempt suicide.2 2 °
The appellate court then found "evidence sufficient to
sustain a finding that the Church negligently breached its
duty to train its counselors in their responsibilities to refer
suicidal counselees or to otherwise insure they were aware of
these responsibilities." 2 2 1 The court, in announcing its decision, was adamant that it had not created a new duty, but
213. Id. at 219. The court stated that the case had "little or nothing to say
about the liability of clergymen for the negligent performance of their ordinary
ministerial duties or even [their counseling relationship with suicidal individuals]." Id.
214. Id. at 234-36. The court explained that California has "an especially
strong public commitment to suicide prevention" as evidenced by Penal Code
§ 401 which makes it a crime to participate in any way in another's suicide. Id.
at 235.
215. Id. at 225.
216. Bellah v. Greenson, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1978).
217. Nally H, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
218. Bellah, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
219. Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp., 432 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1967).
220. Id. at 196. The California Supreme Court rejected what it termed the
appellate court's broad interpretation of Bellah dictum, and emphasized that
the Bellah court never decided the duty issue. Nally III, 763 P.2d 948, 952 (Cal.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989).
221. Nally H, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 230. The court reached its decision based on
the fact that Nally's suicide was foreseeable to the Church's counselors, the
counselors failed to encourage Nally to consult a psychotherapist and actually
said things that discouraged him from doing so. Id. at 229.
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instead had "refused to create a new, broad-gauged defense of
'clergy immunity' for church-affiliated counselors."2 2 2
3.

The California Supreme Court's Holding

After the ground breaking decision was rendered by the
appeals court, the defendants appealed and the California
Supreme Court granted review.2 23 The supreme court reversed the court of appeal and directed the court of appeal to
enter a judgment affirming the superior court's nonsuit and
dismissing the action.22 4 The supreme court first took objection with the court of appeal's imposition of a "new and
broad" duty of care, agreeing with the court of appeal's own
statement that it had ventured "along a largely uncharted
path. '22 5 The supreme court, unlike the court of appeal, was
unwilling to find a special relationship between the defendants and Nally.2 2 6 It felt the appellate court's reliance on
Meir and Vistica was misplaced, finding the cases applicable
only to suicides committed in a hospital, while a patient is
under the care and custody of hospital physicians who are
aware of the patient's unstable mental condition, and fail to
take proper precautions.2 2 7
The court also found it important that the state legislature exempted clergy from the licensing requirements applicable to marriage, family, child, and domestic counselors
under the Business and Professions Code, out of concern that
access to clergy for counseling should be free from state-imposed standards. 228 Extending liability would also conflict
with the public policy goal embraced in the "Good Samaritan"
rule of encouraging private assistance efforts.2 2 9
222. Id. at 243.
223. Nally III, 763 P.2d at 948.
224. Id. at 964.
225. Id. at 955.
226. Id. at 958.
227. Id. at 956. The supreme court maintained that the decisions in Vistica
and Meier were "carefully limited precedent" and the duty was specific to a
supervised medical relationship not found in Nally. Id. at 957.
228. Id. at 959-60. The court felt that by enacting the statute, the Legislature had recognized that access should be free from state imposed counseling
standards and that "the secular state is not equipped to ascertain the competence of counseling when performed by those affiliated with religious organizations." Id. (quoting Ericson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New
Theory, 16 VAL. U. L. REV. 163, 176 (1981)).
229. Nally III, 763 P.2d at 960.
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Before eliminating the tort issues, the supreme court
stated that it "need not address the constitutional issues
posed by defendants,"23 ° leaving unanswered the question of
whether a cause of action for clergy malpractice could ever
withstand a free exercise challenge. The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1989,21 further enhancing the mystery.
Nally III brought fire from commentators who thought
that based on the facts of the case, the pastoral therapists
should have been held to the same, or a similar standard 23of2
care as the licensed therapists who treated the plaintiff.
Despite the holding in Nally III, there has been a tremendous
growth in the number of so-called "clergy malpractice"
cases ,233 indicating a serious problem that needs to be addressed.2 3 4 Since Nally was decided, the First Amendment
landscape has been changed dramatically, first by Smith, and
then by the unprecedented congressional mandate in RFRA.
The changes have made a second evaluation of the claim for
clergy malpractice viable.
4.

The Relationship between RFRA and Nally

The California Supreme Court's holding in Nally III, that
it would be improper to impose a duty on "nontherapist counselors" to refer parishioners to licensed mental health professionals once suicide became a foreseeable risk,23 5 was excep230. Id. at 955.
231. Id.
232. See generally Bergman, supra note 44; Kimmerley Anne Klee, Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the Good Samaritan or a Blessing in
Disguise?, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 209 (1985); Burek, supra note 3.
233. See generally Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988); Hester
v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 553 (Mo. App. 1987); Dausch v. Ryske, 52 F.3d
1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994); Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1987);
Milla v. Tamayo, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453 (1986); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d
275 (Colo. 1988). The actual number of claims may be greater and undereported given the pressure against, and stigma attached to bringing a claim
against a clergyman. No claim for clergy malpractice based on negligence has
yet been sustained.
234. Constance Frisbey Fain, Clergy Malpractice: Liability for Negligent
Counseling and Sexual Misconduct, 12 Miss. C. L. REV. 97 (1991) [hereinafter
Fain].
235. Nally III, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989).
The court used the term "nontherapist counselor" to refer to "counselors other
than psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, or other categories of psychotherapists, who hold themselves out as capable of assisting mentally disturbed people." Id. at 949-50.
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tional. Although the therapists were pastoral counselors,236
the court based its decision on existing tort law,237 stating
that it would not address the defendant's constitutional issues.2 38 A Missouri state court case aptly pointed out the
court's weakness in this decision:
[T]he question Nally leaves unanswered is whether pastoral counseling is so ineluctably a function of the particular religion that no one definition of its malpractice can
evolve into a standard of professional performance, and is
otherwise so purely sacerdotal a function, that it is both
unfeasible as
a theory of tort and not constitutionally
23 9
permissible.
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court
in 1989, certiorari was denied.24 ° Presumably, had the Court
addressed the constitutional issue, it would have initially applied the analysis articulated in Cantwell v. Connecticut,24 '
which differentiates between religious belief and conduct, followed by the Sherbert v. Verner 242 test of balancing religious
freedom and governmental interests. Since Nally III was decided, the applicable free exercise test has changed twice.243
The Supreme Court broke with well established constitutional tradition in its startling decision in Employment Division v. Smith.244 After thirty years of applying strict scrutiny
to laws placing significant burdens on religious practices, the
Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Justice Scalia, held that
the Free Exercise Clause does not protect religiously-motivated behavior that conflicts with a "valid and neutral law of
general applicability. '245 Smith, however, did not preclude a
legislature from creating an exemption for a religious prac236. Id. at 950.
237. Id. at 955.

238. Id.
239. Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 553 (Mo. App. 1987).

240. Nally v. Grace Community Church, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989).
241. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The Cantwell opinion

enunciated the constitutional decree that while the First Amendment freedom
of religious belief is absolute, the freedom to act in the exercise of that belief is
not. Id. at 303-04. The Nally trial court cited Cantwell for this proposition,

maintaining that counseling falls within the latter category. Nally 11, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 215, 223 (Ct. App. 1987).
242. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

243. See discussion supra Part II.A.
244. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
245. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Steven, J. concurring)).
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tice, although such exemptions were not constitutionally
required.2 4 6
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act,2 4 7 enacted in
1994 in response to the Smith decision, by its very language, 248 eradicates the Smith holding and makes the Sherbert strict scrutiny analysis "supreme" once again. Thus a
claim brought for clergy malpractice today would have to satisfy the Sherbert test as applied to the free exercise of religion 24 9 and perhaps the Lemon test as regards establishment 2 50 in order to sustain a summary judgment motion. In
addition, there are several policy concerns cited by opponents
of clergy malpractice that also need to be addressed.
a. Insurance
Insurance for clergy malpractice has become available in
the last decade.2 5 1 In 1982, Church Mutual Insurance Company insured 27,000 churches in thirty-five states, yet very
few cases for clergy malpractice had been filed. 25 2 Without
insurance, a small church facing a clergy malpractice claim
might also be facing financial ruin.
b.

Clergy-Penitent Privilege

The imposition of a duty on the part of clerical counselors
to refer needy counselees to trained psychologists or psychiatrists might appear to implicate a violation of the clergy-penitent privilege. California Evidence Code section 1033251 provides that "[s]ubject to section 912, a penitent, whether or not
a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent
another from disclosing, a penitential communication if he
246. Id. at 890.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
248. The Act provides that "Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden
to the person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (1994).
249. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
250. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
251. See David Ranii [hereinafter Ranii], Clergy Malpractice-ThePrayerfor
Relief, NAT'L LAW J., Mar. 4, 1985, at 30; Maury M. Breecher, Ministerial Malpractice: Is It a Reasonable Fear?, 16 TRAL,July 1980, at 12-13.
252. Brooks, supra note 35, at 1301.
253. CAL.EVID. CODE § 1033 (West 1996).
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claims the privilege."2 5 4 Section 1034 provides a parallel
privilege for the clergy member. 255 However, California
courts have restricted the statutory privilege to matters
made during the confessional format, usually the confession
of crimes or sins for which the confessor wishes forgiveness. 2 6 Therefore, in California, the privilege is unaffected
by the advent of a clergy malpractice action.
III.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM

The reversal of the intermediate appeals decision in
Nally III, holding that the clergy malpractice and negligence
counts taken together stated a cause of action, has left
Californians without redress for the consequences of negligent clerical counseling. Similar conduct provided by a licensed therapist would be actionable.2 5 7 The consequence is
that the less trained, and thus the most dangerous, are able
to wield the same power with immunity. The public requires
equal, if not more protection from these individuals.
Claims for intentional torts against clergy have been upheld in many jurisdictions, 258 but as of yet no court has sustained a negligence-based cause of action for clergy malpractice. An interesting correlative proposal is raised in the Note,
The Role of Law in Suicide Prevention: Beyond Civil Commitment-A Bystander Duty to Report Suicide Threats, 25 9 in
which the author suggests that due to the tremendous proportion of the "societal ailment" of suicide, and the state having a "compelling interest in protecting the life ... of its citizens," the only practical approach is prevention of suicide,
which necessarily entails reporting by citizens.2 6 0 The author
also finds that because the reporting requirement protects society by focusing on the harm the individual causes it, it is
encompassed by the police power. 2 6 1 This comment suggests
254. Id.
255. Id.

256. Burek, supra note 3, at 156; see also Simrin v. Simrin, 233 Cal. App. 2d
90, 95 (1965) (holding that hearing confessions is not counseling conduct);

Brooks, supra note 35, at 1299.
257. Nally 11, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 223 (Ct. App. 1987).
258. Lehman, supra note 38 n.8 and accompanying text.

259. Kate E. Bloch, Note, Civil Commitment-A Bystander Duty to Report
Suicide Threats, 39 STAN. L.
260. Id. at 935-36.
261. Id. at 936-37.

REV.

929 (1987) [hereinafter Bloch].
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that a duty should be imposed on clerical counselors to refer
suicidal parishioners to psychologists or psychiatrists. In order to implement such a duty, a neutral duty of care must
apply.

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Nally
1. The Duty

Prior to Nally, California courts had determined that a
hospital and treating psychiatrist have a special relationship
with a suicidal patient when they have accepted responsibility for that person's care. 2 62 The court of appeal in Nally I
made a logical extension of this case law to encompass the
relationship between the cleric and the parishioner he (or
she) counsels. 263 The court reached this decision by concluding that there was a similar, if not identical, dependence on
the counselor which the counselor had voluntarily undertaken.264 The court was careful to distinguish this duty from
the imposition of a duty for casual advice dispensed by a pastor, emphasizing that the Church had advertised its counselors as competent to treat a full spectrum of serious emotional
problems. 265 It also was persuaded by the close, long-term
relationship that Nally had with his counselors.2 6
The California Supreme Court attacked the court of appeal for using "widely varying terminology" in describing the
duty of care it imposed, and took pains to point out how
"loosely phrased" the duty was.2 67 The supreme court also
criticized the finding of a special relationship between Nally
and the Church counselors, insisting that this type of rela262. See discussion supra Part II.F.2.
263. The court said "the duty [these cases] announced applies likewise to
counselors, other than licensed psychotherapists, who hold themselves out as
capable of dealing with mental and emotional illness severe enough to lead to
suicide." Nally H, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 225 (1987).
264. Id. at 225-26. The court asserted that "whether a psychiatrist or not,
the counselor usually has invited the counselee's dependence by holding himself
out as especially competent to treat emotional problems." Id. at 226.
265. Id. at 226.
266. Id.
267. Nally III, 763 P.2d 948, 955 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007
(1989). The court relied on Justice Cole's dissent in the court of appeals decision for this proposition alleging that the court of appeal's use of different language in its analysis constituted vagueness.
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tionship exists under California law only in the limited context addressed by Bellah v.Greenson.26 The court instead
determined that the California cases taken together stand for
the existence of a cause of action for traditional professional
malpractice when a psychiatrist's or hospital's treatment
falls below the standard of care for the profession. 2 69 How-

ever, the court stated in a footnote that its opinion "does not
foreclose imposing liability on nontherapist counselors, who
hold themselves out as professionals, for injuries related to
their counseling activities."27 °
It is reasonable to assume that under the facts of the
Nally case, there did exist a special relationship between
Nally and his counselors. Nally and the Church counselors
had a long-term, close relationship, which was voluntarily entered into by both parties and fostered over an extended period of time. 1 While to a certain extent the counselors encouraged Nally to obtain medical care, 2 they never referred
him to a licensed psychiatrist, a simple step that could have
saved a young man's life. Clearly, Nally was quite dependent
on the counselors, and their extensive use of advertising and
27 3
proselytizing about their abilities in the area of counseling
strengthened his dependence on, and faith in them.
The cases cited by the court of appeal clearly indicate a
trend of establishing a special relationship which certainly
could encompass the Nally case. Additionally, the testimony
of the Church counselors in regard to their competency to
treat a whole range of mental illnesses 274 could be considered
"holding of themselves out" as professionals,2 75 especially
of the Church's counselees
when it is noted that fifty percent
2 76
were not Church members.

268. Id. at 956-58.
269. Id. at 958.
270. Id. at 961 n.8. Ironically, there was much evidence to warrant this very
imposition. Id. at 965 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
271. Nally 11, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 226 (Ct. App. 1987).
272. Nally III, 763 P.2d at 951-52. After his release from the hospital, MacArthur recommended that Nally see Dr. Parker, a physician and Church deacon
for a physical. Id. at 951. Dr. Parker recommended that Nally commit himself
to a psychiatrist hospital, but Nally did not and continued to treat with the
clerical counselors instead. Id. at 951-52.
273. Id. at 950, 965 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
274. Id. at 950, 964-65 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
275. Id. at 965 n.2 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
276. Id. at 964 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
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2. Standardof Care
At trial after the initial remand by the court of appeal,
the court heard testimony by four experts regarding the general standard of care to be followed by the counseling community in dealing with a suicidal individual.2 77 Each of them
testified that while the standard varies among secular and
denominational counselors, a counselor has a general duty to
investigate the counseled person's suicidal tendencies and to
encourage that person to seek professional help once suicide
becomes foreseeable. 27 8 After finding that the therapists had

a duty to take appropriate precautions against a suicide, the
court held that the duty was applicable only if the suicide was
foreseeable to them.27 9
The California Supreme Court was unpersuaded that
Nally's statements were enough to constitute foreseeability,
asserting that "the closeness of connection between defendants conduct and Nally's suicide was tenuous at best."28 0 The

court seemed to place great emphasis on the fact that the
Church therapists "encouraged Nally to cooperate with all
doctors."28 ' The court was adamant that "mere foreseeability

of the harm or knowledge of the danger, is insufficient to create a legally cognizable special relationship giving rise to a
legal duty to prevent harm."282 The supreme court also dismissed the testimony of the experts, finding their suggested
standards of care to be "vague and dependent on the personal
predilections of the individual counselor or denomination,
and not officially or formally adopted by any organized body
of counselors."28 3
Cumulatively, if not individually, Nally's question to
Pastor Thomson regarding whether Christians who commit
suicide would nonetheless be "saved,"284 his statement to
277. Id. at 953.
278. Nally III, 763 P.2d at 953. Id. The court found the suggested standards
to be "vague and dependent on the personal predilections of the individual
counselor or denomination and not officially or formally adopted by any organized body of counselors." Id.
279. Nally 11, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 226-27 (Ct. App. 1987). The court held that
the standard of care would not be violated where the counselor's behavior would
not lead a nontherapist counselor to that same conclusion. Id. at 226.
280. Nally III, 763 P.2d at 958.
281. Id. at 959.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 953.
284. Id. at 952.
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Pastor MacArthur 285 while hospitalized that he was sorry he
had not succeeded in killing himself, and his statement to
Pastor Rea that given the opportunity after his release, he
would attempt suicide again,2 8 6 were enough to constitute a

"foreseeable" suicide attempt. In addition, the concurrence
by Justice Kaufman reiterates specific testimony by Pastor
Thomson which reveals that he was personally aware of
Nally's fragile mental health, his thoughts of suicide prior to
his first attempt, and intimations of a second attempt.28 7
Because suicide is often a cry for help,28 8 Nally's pastoral
counselors were extremely remiss in not taking heed of this
cry, especially in light of Nally's prior attempt which resulted
in hospitalization.289 While there is such a thing as a "rational suicide,"29 ° in light of the fact that Nally expressed his
suicidal intentions to at least three of his counselors within a
short period of an actual attempt, it is logical to assume that
he was attempting to communicate his despondency and his
need for help; help he did not receive. Nally made "warning"
statements to the Church therapists, not to the doctors with
whom he was encouraged to cooperate, because it was these
therapists whom he had come to rely on and therefore trust.
They encouraged the relationship, and should not be able to
shirk responsibility for fostering it by attempting to encourage Nally to "cooperate" with his medical doctors after
the fact.
The difficulty with the standard of care chosen by the
court of appeal was not made clear by the supreme court
opinion, since it refused to address the constitutional issues
285. Id. at 951.
286. Nally 11, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
287. Nally III, 763 P.2d 948, 966-67 (Cal. 1988) (Kaufman, J., concurring).
Justice Kaufman asserted that the majority either mischaracterized Rea's testimony or, contrary to fundamental principles of appellate review, drew only
those references favorable to defendants. Id. at 966 n.3.
288. See Bloch, supra note 235, at 938. Bloch emphasizes that suicide attempts are largely "cries for help" and the number of "rational" suicides is but a
small fraction. Id. at 938 n.63. "Rational suicides" are defined as suicides made
by mature individuals after calm reflection. Id. While an empirical study has
confirmed that mental health professionals cannot accurately predict who will
commit suicide, see Pokorny, Predictionof Suicide in PsychiatricPatients,40
ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 249 (1983), Bloch's article cites alarming statistics
which indicate every warning should be taken seriously. Id. at 929 n.2.
289. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
290. See Bloch, supra note 235, at 938 n.63.
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of the case.291 Although foreseeability can be proven in
Nally, in order for the cause of action to exist, the standard of
care must be neutral enough to escape an Establishment
Clause entanglement problem.292 The degree of prohibited
entanglement is estimated by evaluating three things.293
The first is the character and purpose of the religious institution; second, the nature of the aid or detriment; and third, the
resulting relationship between the government and religious
authorities.294
3. First Amendment Issues
The court of appeal began its opinion by stressing that it
had not created a new cause of action for clergy malpractice.295 Rather it had relied on established principles of California law to impose a duty of care on counselors who undertake a counseling relationship with mentally disturbed
suicidal individuals, whether or not those counselors are affiliated with a religious institution.296
The court responded to defendants' contentions that they
were immune to the imposition of such a duty because of the
First Amendment's guarantee of the right to free exercise of
religion, by reiterating that Cantwell provides only limited
protection for the expression of those beliefs: "[f]reedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be."297 The court then applied the Sherbert test, as modified by United States v. Lee,298
to the acts in Nally.299
The court held that the State's compelling interest in
preservation of life justified the indirect burden imposed on
religious expression by the referral requirement.3 °° It also
found that the duty recognized by the opinion was the "least
restrictive means of achieving [that] compelling state inter291. Nally III, 763 P.2d 948, 955 (1988).
292. A neutral standard of care is discussed infra Part V.
293. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 18, at 1162.
294. Id.
295. Nally H, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 219 (1987).
296. Id. at 231.
297. Id. at 223.
298. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). In Lee, the Court set forth a clear exposition of the
three prongs of the strict scrutiny free expression test. Id. at 257-58.
299. Id. at 231-32.
300. Id. at 234.
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est."3 0 1 In addition, the court concluded that imposing a duty
to refer individuals to professional therapists did not burden
the free exercise of religion by the Church counselors, because the responsibility was not inconsistent with their religious beliefs. 2
Oddly enough, the supreme court chose not to respond to
the constitutional questions raised by the appellate court,
stating that it "need not address the constitutional issues
posed by defendants," 3 thus, leaving unanswered the question of the future of a clergy malpractice claim.
4. Policy Considerations
The dissent in Nally I accused the majority of "inappropriately making policy decisions instead of only declaring [the
law] as it exists."3 0 4 This sentiment was the precursor to the
majority opinion in Nally 111.305 The Nally I majority responded that the dissent mischaracterized its opinion and
"the role of the courts in deciding issues in the law of torts
and constitutional law."3 0 6 The appellate court was firm in
its resolution that it had merely "accepted the policies furthered by ....

existing law" of holding licensed psychothera-

pists to a duty to prevent suicide, and that it had only taken
the "tiniest of baby steps beyond those decisions. ' 30 7 The
court felt that rather than create a new duty, it had "refused
to create a new broad-gauged defense of 'clergy immunity' for
church-affiliated 8counselors" who treat mentally disturbed,
30
suicidal people.
The California Supreme Court could not have disagreed
more, finding that "neither the evidence adduced at trial nor
well established principles of tort law" supported the court of
301. Id. at 237 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 718 (1981)).
302. Id. at 232-33. The court made its finding based on the record before the
trial court when hearing the nonsuit motion.
303. Nally III, 763 P.2d 948, 955 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007
(1989).
304. Nally II, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 241 (Ct. App. 1987).
305. Id.
306. Id. The court argued that it had decided the two principle issues in the
case through the most traditional and conservative methods of legal analysis.
Id.
307. Id. at 242.
308. Id. at 243. The court maintained it did this "out of a profound reverence
for those constitutional values-and for the value of human life." Id.
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appeal's reversal of the nonsuit.3 0 9 Because it did not discuss
the constitutional issues, it appears that the supreme court's
severe disagreement with the court of appeal was generated
by policy concerns. The supreme court insisted that even if
Nally's suicide were foreseeable, it should not give rise to a
duty to refer, because that would necessarily impose a general duty on all nontherapists to refer all potentially suicidal
persons to licensed medical practitioners, which could stifle
gratuitous or religious counseling.3 1 °
The court interpreted the Legislature's exemption of
clergy from the licensing requirements applicable to marriage, family, child and domestic counselors under the California Business and Profession Code 3 11 to be a recognition of
the state's inability to ascertain the competence of counseling
by those affiliated with religious organizations. 1 2 The court
also felt that extending liability in this area would interfere
with the public policy goals expressed in the "Good Samaritan" rule embodied in California Government Code section
50086.313
The supreme court also feared that the duty outlined by
the appellate court would necessarily be entwined with the
religious philosophy, denomination or teachings of the religious entity.3 1 4 The supreme court summed up its opinion in
its proclamation that it had "previously refused to impose a
duty when to do so would involve complex policy decisions,
and [was] unpersuaded by plaintiffs that [it] should depart
from this policy in the present case."315
It is interesting to note that while the court did not discuss the constitutional issues raised by the defendants, it
raised issues of religious entanglement in its discussion of
policy. 3 16 Arguably, the court has it backwards. The duty of
a therapist to refer a suicidal counselee to psychiatric care is
religiously neutral. In Nally, the defendants admitted as
309. Nally III, 763 P.2d 948, 954 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007

(1989).
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 959.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4980 (West 1988).
Nally III, 76 P.2d at 960.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50086 (West 1988).
Nally III, 763 P.2d at 960. This is the only discussion in the supreme

court opinion regarding the First Amendment. Id.
315. Id.

316. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
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much when they acknowledged that their religious beliefs did
not prohibit them from advising counselees to seek psychiatric care.317
B.

Clergy Malpractice Under RFRA

In Sherbert and Yoder, the cases that RFRA established
as controlling, the Court said that religious practices legitimately subject to regulation are those that "[p]ose some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." 3 18 The pre-

vention of a troubled individual's suicide is arguably such a
threat. Some commentators have gone so far as to say that
the government may have both a right and a duty to regulate
a counseling ministry when it threatens health, safety, welfare, or other pressing societal interests.3 1 9 The court of appeal in Nally II seemed to agree, stating that "[s]ociety has a
profound interest in preventing its citizens from committing
suicide."

32 °

Society's interest in preserving the life of a would-be suicide is as profound as its interest in preserving life generally. To this end, society surely may require a pastoral
counselor who invites and undertakes a counseling relationship with an individual in whom he recognizes suicidal tendencies, to advise that individual to seek competent care. 32 '
Others have suggested that to allow such a standard is to
prevent religious freedom in the majority of cases. 2 2 In order to preserve religious freedom, they say, "society must be
willing to tolerate some risk of public harm; it is unrealistic to
think otherwise."3

23

How unrealistic is it really in a case like

Nally, where the defendants admitted that their negligence
was not a product of their religious beliefs? 3 2 4 They had no

abiding belief that counseling other than pastoral was
317. Nally III, 763 P.2d at 959.
318. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 230 (1972) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963));
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
319. See Maureen Anders, Casenote, Religious Counseling-ParentsAllowed
to Pursue Suit Against Church and Clergy for Son's Suicide-Nally v. Grace
Community Church, 1985 ARIz. ST. L.J. 213, 233 (1985).
320. Nally 11, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
321. Nally III, 763 P.2d at 970 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
322. See Berg, supra note 72, at 36.

323. Id.
324. See Nally II, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
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outside their faith, and had in fact referred the troubled man
to a nonsecular therapist previously.3 25
The problems with a case like Nally may still exist under
RFRA, unless the duty and standard of care are clearly and
neutrally defined. 26 Otherwise, a finding could be made that
free exercise was being substantially burdened or that the
court was becoming entangled in an impermissible manner in
violation of the establishment clause.3 2 7 However, under the

Sherbert compelling interest test, the state's interest in the
protection of life could be sufficiently compelling to outweigh
any burden on the clergy counselor. The court could balance
the counselor's religious liberty against the competing governmental interest in the preservation of life, and determine
that the life was worth saving.
C. Clergy Malpractice Under Smith
A 1994 Illinois case illustrates the viability of a clergy
malpractice claim under Smith. Dausch v.Ryske 328 was decided by the United States Court of Appeal for the Seventh
Circuit just prior to the enactment of RFRA. Circuit Judge
Ripple's concurring opinion discussed the viability of a clergy
malpractice action when the cleric's counseling is based on
purely secular considerations.3

29

While recognizing that the

cause of action for clergy malpractice has been rejected by all
states that have considered it, 33 0 he determined this did not

extend to the activity of a cleric where the conduct in question
"does not bear a direct relationship to the doctrinal or organizational aspects of religious practice." 33 ' Judge Ripple asserted "such activity can be proscribed by a legitimate regulation of general applicability designed to protect the health,
safety or good morals of the community,"33

of Smith.33 3

2

echoing the lan-

Judge Ripple argued that secular counselguage
ing, when provided by a cleric, would be subject to the same
325. Id.
326. See discussion supra Part II.A.
327. See discussion infra Parts 1V.A.1-2.

328. Dausch v. Ryske, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994).
329. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 119.
332. See supra note 120.

333. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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legal strictures as those imposed upon individuals who un33
dertake to provide equal services in a nonreligious setting. 1
If Nally had reached the Supreme Court after Smith had
been decided, it might have been decided in much the same
manner as Dausch. The facts are similar, in that the counselors who treated Nally held themselves out as competent to
treat secular emotional problems, if not directly, then
through their literature, advertising, and court testimony. 33 5
While an entanglement challenge could be raised, the court
would not be involved in determining religious belief or doctrine, but would be imposing a neutral standard. 3 6 Should
the Supreme Court decide to overrule RFRA, a plaintiff in a
case like Nally might actually obtain a recovery.
D.

The Future of RFRA

Congress passed RFRA under the aegis of Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions" of the Amendment. 3 7 In doing so,
Congress asserted that its power under the Amendment included congressional power to enforce the Free Exercise
Clause, which is incorporated into the Due Process Clause of
Section 1 of the Amendment. 3 8 The Act's stated purpose is
to restore application of the compelling interest test to free
3 39
exercise challenges.
What Congress has done is similar to the posture it took
in enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1964, legislatively mandating a statutory protection broader than the narrow constitutional protections the Court had interpreted. 4 ° Inevitably,
this conflict will encourage a challenge to the Act.3 4 1 The propriety of Congress mandating a judicial test for a constitutional question continues to be debated by legal scholars.3 2
Thomas Berg says RFRA is "simply an exercise of Congress' undoubted power to control the activities of the federal
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part II.F.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
Berg, supra note 72, at 62-63 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
Laycock, supra note 79, at 896.
Id. at 897.
See Berg, supra note 72, at 62 n.273.
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government."3 4 3 But isn't Congress exceeding its powers by
effectively overruling Smith? Berg maintains that in its use
of the Fourteenth Amendment, "Congress is using its powers
to create a statutory right where the Court refused to declare
a constitutional one."3 4 4 Does it violate the paramount decree
of Marbury v. Madison that, "it is emphatically the province
of the judicial department, to say what the law
and3 4duty
is?" 5 What about the strict rules set forth in the Constitution about amending it? 3 46 This comment does not discuss
these larger issues, but rather considers the most recent
cases decided under RFRA and what they bring to the discussion of clergy malpractice.
In addition to separation of powers problems, there may
be problems with the language of the Act being so amiguous
that the Supreme Court could find it inapplicable to the majority of free exercise challenges in an effort to be defferential
to the government.34 7 It is also thought by commentators
that the ambiguities in the application of the strict scrutiny
test will lead to ineffectiveness of the Act. 348 RFRA is not intended to be congressional authorization for absolute protection for religion, but calls for substantial reliance on previous
law.3 4 9 Of course this could cause an interesting dilemma for
the Court. While the Court has lacked a coherent concept of
what a "compelling interest" is, and has decided to abandon
the concept altogether, it has now been told to apply case law
it no longer believes in, to decide future cases. Due to the
subjectivity of the compelling interest test, there is no guarantee that RFRA will accomplish what Congress intended.
There is also a real danger in the ability of Congress to
amend the statute. Due to the mandated application of
RFRA, congressional amendments that cut out protections
for unpopular religions would have to prevail.3 50 Leaving accommodation to the political process may place religious
343. Id. at 62.
344. Id. at 63.
345. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
346. For a list of discussions of the Morgan power, see Berg, supra note 72, at
64 n.283.
347. Berg, supra note 72, at 3.
348. Id. at 3-4. See also Saison, supra note 63, at 665.
349. Berg, supra note 72, at 3.
350. Laycock, supra note 79, at 896.
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practices not widely engaged in at a disadvantage.3 51 These
are the kinds of religious practice the First Amendment was
originally designed to protect. Were this to occur, the Act
would lose its appeal to many of those who fought so hard to
see it enacted, as well as its credibility with the public.
One commentator has suggested that given his analysis
of the Justices' predilections in this area, the Court's rule in
Smith will continue to be upheld by a 5-4 vote, should there
be one.3 5 2 While it may take years for an RFRA challenge to

be granted certiorari by the Supreme Court, several recent
federal cases shed light on the current status of the application of RFRA. 53
Justice Thomas expressed his approval of RFRA in his
dissent from the certiorari denial 35 4 in Swanner v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Commission.355 However, at the same time,
Justice Thomas also discussed the "considerable confusion"
the state courts have had in applying the Sherbert-Yoder test
to the specific issues of the case.356 The confusion in the state
courts may be a reflection of the RFRA landscape in the
Supreme Court. While Congress has mandated that the
Court apply the strict scrutiny test in all free exercise challenges,357 the test affords no consistent interpretation. 5 8
The other federal cases that have come down since RFRA
was enacted that have addressed it, 3 59 indicate that the judi-

ciary is split on Congress' ability to enact RFRA, whether
they agree with the Smith holding or not. By way of expressing their concerns, even when unwarranted, they are sending a message to the Supreme Court about where they stand
on overruling RFRA.
A decision by the Court on the constitutionality of RFRA
will have a direct impact on the future of a clergy malpractice
claim. Should RFRA be overruled, the federal courts presumably will revert to the Smith test and the application of the
general applicability standard as it is their last word on the
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Berg, supra note 72, at 9.
Id. at 8 n.22.
See supra note 138 and discussion supra Part II.E.
See discussion supra Part II.E.
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
Id. at 462.
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part II.E.
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issue. A clergy malpractice action is very possible under the
Smith standard, while the RFRA test is harder to meet.
V.

PROPOSAL

The public should be allowed to make claims for clergy
malpractice as a result of negligent counseling. This would
ensure a remedy when counselors neglect or aggravate their
counselees' preexisting mental or emotional illnesses. The
burden on the practice of religion should only outweigh society's interest in the protection of its citizens' mental health in
extreme situations, where it is impossible to impose a standard of care without violating the Establishment Clause. The
"neutral" standard of care, addressed below, should prevent
that.
While one commentator suggests a legal duty on the part
of all citizens to report all suicide threats to a crisis hotline
staffed by a mental health professional, 3 60 this comment suggests only that therapists, pastoral or secular, licensed or not,
should be under a legal duty to refer the patient to a licensed
psychologist when suicide is foreseeable. When a person acting as a therapist holds himself or herself out to a patient as
one who can help, the statement should be accurate. As
Bloch suggests, "[s]ometimes simply caring enough to respond is important to those individuals desperately crying
out for help."3 6 '
One student commentator has suggested that the way to
ensure survival of a clergy malpractice claim is to bring it
alone, without any supporting intentional tort claims for the
36 2 Several courts
court to use as a substitute cause of action.
have agreed, indicating that a claimant needs to show how a
clergy malpractice differs from existing intentional tort and
3 63
In this way,
negligence claims in order to be successful.
the court is not forced to "stretch" itself to create a new cause
of action, as the court of appeal was accused of doing in Nally
11.364 However, if designed in such a manner as to alleviate
the specter of First Amendment problems, the courts may be
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
(1989).

See discussion supra Part III.
See Bloch, supra note 259, at 946.
Anthony, supra note 36, at 493-94.
See supra note 297.
Nally III, 763 P.2d 948, 956 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007
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willing to allow a cause of action for clergy malpractice. An
attempt to fabricate such a standard is outlined below.
A.

Duty

A legal duty is a court-imposed protection granted to a
particular plaintiff or class of plaintiffs because the court
feels it is necessary.3 6 5 In Nally 11, the California Court of
Appeal attempted to impose a legal duty on the clergy counselors . 66 They endeavored to accomplish this by extending
the existing California law holding that a hospital and treating psychiatrist have a special relationship with a suicidal
patient when they have accepted responsibility for that person's care. 3 67 This is a logical extension of case law in which
counselors hold themselves out as being capable of dealing
with severe mental and emotional illnesses. As the court of
appeal found, the dependence is similar if not identical to
that of a patient on his or her licensed therapist, and is a
voluntary relationship. 68 The court may choose to extend
the case law to allow a cause of action for clergy malpractice
due to this "special relationship." In the alternative, the Legislature could draft a statute requiring all therapists, licensed or not, to refer the patient to a psychologist or psychiatrist when they are involved in counseling beyond their
capabilities.
B.

The Neutral Standard of Care

While commentators have suggested several alternative
standards of care for a clergy malpractice action, 9 the most
appropriate standard of care is the "neutral standard."3 7 °
The neutral standard would prevent the government and the
courts from intruding upon the areas of First Amendment
protection for religion, content, and methodology. 3 7 1 The
standard consists of a threshold test which must be met to
determine if the standard of care may be imposed, before proceeding to a three prong test which focuses on whether a vio365.
1976).
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal.
Nally H, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 225 (1987).
Id. See discussion supra Part MV.A.1.
Nally II, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26.
See Fain, supra note 211.
See discussion supra Part II.A.3.d.
See discussion supra Part II.A.3.d.
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lation occurred at all, as opposed to the degree of violation. 2
In order for liability to be evaluated, only one of the three
prongs need be violated. 7 3
Threshold Test

1.

The threshold test is two part in nature, with both a subjective and an objective component. 7 4 Objectively, the religious counseling at issue must be structured with "the intent
of moving toward an identifiable goal recognized by both the
clergy and counselee."3 7' The subjective part of the test 3in76
volves the perception of the experience by each party.
Both parts of the test must be satisfied in order to assess the
occurrence of malpractice in the counseling setting, and thus,
liability.3 7 7
First Prong

2.

Once past the threshold, the first prong of the standard
of care is testing and diagnosis.37 ' This ensures that the
counsellor is conscious of the emotional and psychological
problems facing the counseleeA7 9
3.

Second Prong

The second prong of the standard of care is referral to a
qualified professional.3 ° If the cleric recognizes that a certain problem is beyond his or her skill or training level, the
parishioner should be referred to a qualified professional. 3 8 '
This is the corollary of a medical practitioner referring a pa3 82
tient to a specialist.
4.

Third Prong

The third prong of the standard of care is the area of
training.38 3 The clergy member must train those associated
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

See Burek, supra note 3, at 157.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Burek, supra note 3, at 157.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 159.
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with him or her to meet minimal standards of diagnostics,
and provide the ability to determine when a referral should
occur. 84 Training, if religious or doctrinal, may run afoul of
the First Amendment if the court attempts to make a comparison between secular and religious training. Thus, the
training required and evaluated by the court should be basic
diagnosis, with a focus on the ability to determine when the
counselor is in "over his or her head." This is a minimal standard not involving a First Amendment entanglement issue.
C. Implications of the Proposal
In order to protect himself or herself from a clergy malpractice claim, the cleric need only meet these three neutral
requirements, which demand no evaluation of doctrinal or
religious perspectives. 38 5 The neutral standard, in effect, provides protection for both the counselee and the counselor. Of
course, in order to prove a clergy malpractice claim, the traditional tort elements of duty, breach, and causation must be
met.
Burek, the proponent of the neutral standard, suggests
three "fatal flaws" in the argument that the clergy has a mandate to protect their parishioner from professional counsel
who might undermine their religious faith. 6 First, the
clergy, like his or her professional counterpart, should develop a network of referrals for potential clients.387 Second,
should the clergy member be unable to provide adequate care
for the parishioner, the counselee would be in the same situation of seeking care from a secular counselor, whether or not
he or she adhered to the same religious principles.3

8

Third,

failure to make a referral could create significant danger or
risk to the counselee.3 9
1. ChillingEffect
This proposal involves complex policy decisions in that it
may impact the encouragement of private assistance efforts.
However, it will also have a positive impact by ensuring coun384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

See Burek, supra note 3, at 159-60.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 158-59.
Id. at 159.

Id.
Id.

CLERGY MALPRACTICE

1997]

513

selees of quality of the services 3 90 and the possibility of redress should the counselors not meet that standard. There
has been a major insurgence of fundamentalist churches into
the area of counseling.3 9 ' With the increase comes the increased perception among parishioners of the competency of
these religious counselors,3 9 2 as well as the actual increased
risk of injury and damage to counselees. This proposal will
ensure respectability for those who offer these types of services to their parishioners.
While it is usually true that the counselee selects his or
her own denomination and chooses his or her counselor voluntarily, 9 3 the counselor also enters the relationship voluntarily. There is a certain amount of vulnerability involved in
any type of power relationship. The counselee looks to the
cleric for guidance, and is placing his or her faith and trust in
the cleric to fulfill that need. To a certain extent, it is the
feeling of powerlessness that leads the counselee into the
relationship.
Imposing liability for negligent counseling would help to
equalize the playing field by increasing the comfort level of
parishioners, and the competency and respectability of clerical counselors. While it may be true that some people feel
more comfortable and secure taking their problems to a
cleric, and consequently a cleric may be able to get involved
at an earlier stage than other professionals, a duty to refer
should not change that. A professional referral will only be
used in the direst of circumstances, when the parishioner is
clearly suicidal. The clergy-parishioner relationship would
remain unchanged prior to that time. The cleric who wants
the best for his or her parishioner should have no problem
with the imposition of a duty to refer in order to avoid the
aggravation of the parishioner's emotional problems, or worse
yet, fatal consequences such as those which occurred in
Nally.
2.

Opening of the Floodgates

The idea that attempts to regulate and impose standards
on pastoral counseling will create a flood of clergy malprac390.
391.
392.
393.

See Bergman, supra note 44, at 61-62.
Id.
Burek, supra note 3, at 156.
Bill Girner, To Err is Human, CAL LAW., Aug. 1985, at 21.
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tice suits 39 4 is also without merit. To believe this is to also
suspect that there is a great amount of negligent counseling
occurring. Providing a means of financial redress should not
encourage the negligence to occur in the first place.
3. Effect on Insurance
Insurance for clergy malpractice has become available in
the last decade and is relatively inexpensive and cost effective. 9 5 In 1985, just prior to the Nally 11 trial, $300,000
worth of liability insurance cost just $25 a month in premiums. 39 Like any other insurance coverage, should claims
rise dramatically, premiums will as well. However, the availability of a claim for clergy malpractice does not necessarily
translate into the commission of malpractice. The availability of insurance eliminates the possibility of financial ruin for
an individual cleric or small church, while still providing a
remedy for plaintiffs.
Should a neutral standard of care be applied to allow for
successful clergy malpractice claims, the accessibility of insurance would safeguard against a financial disaster for
churches offering counseling services to parishioners.
4. Effect on Clergy-PenitentPrivilege
California Evidence Code section 1033311 provides that
"[s]ubject to Section 912, a penitent, whether or not a party,
has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another
from disclosing, a penitential communication if he claims the
privilege."3 98 Section 1034 provides a parallel privilege for
the clergy member. 39 9 However, California courts have restricted the statutory privilege to matters made during the
confessional format, usually the confession of crimes or sins
for which the confessor wishes forgiveness. 40 0 Therefore, in
California, the privilege is unaffected by the advent of a
394. Burek, supra note 3, at 156.
See Ranii, supra, note 227, at 30.
395. Martin R. Bartel, Clergy Malpractice: "Touch Not My Anointed, and to
My Prophets do no Harm," 35 VILL. L. REv. 535, 565-66 (1990).
See discussion supra Part II.F.3.b.
396. See Ranii, supra, note 227, at 30.
397. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1033 (West 1996).
398. Id.
399. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1034 (West 1996).
400. See supra note 256.
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clergy malpractice action. A cleric who felt compelled to refer
a parishioner in need of care he or she could not provide to a
trained psychiatrist or psychologist, would not be violating
the clergy-penitent privilege. The cleric need not divulge
more information than that required to refer the parishioner.
A therapist patient privilege would attach to the subsequent
relationship, and no confidence would be violated.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The courts should recognize a tort claim for clergy malpractice for negligent counseling except in the extreme case
where the Establishment Clause is blatantly violated. The
cleric-counselee relationship may often be characterized as
special; a voluntary relationship with great dependence
placed on the counselor. Clergy should not be allowed to escape liability because the First Amendment guarantees them
Freedom of Expression. While the First Amendment in certain circumstances may be used as a shield, broadening its
scope to clothe religious organizations and clergy with blanket immunity from prosecution could convert it into a
sword. 4 10 The First Amendment also guarantees such freedom to the counselee and that he or she should not be harmed
while ostensibly expressing it, while the clergy is immune
from liability.
Under a neutral standard of care, the court need not become entangled with religion in violation of the Constitution
by attempting to decipher the counselor's religious belief systems or doctrinal philosophies. The neutral standard applies
guidelines that all therapists can easily meet, whether secular or religious. To allow a cause of action when that standard is not met is to ensure the competence and respectability of the counselor, and the security of the counselee. To ask
a therapist to refer a severely disturbed individual to a competent licensed psychiatrist does not offend the relationship,
but insures the mental health and safety of the counselee,
and in a greater sense, the community.
MargaretAnn Burton
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